Although much has been written about the importance of leadership in the determination of organizational success, there is little quantitative evidence due to the difficulty separating the impact of leaders from other organizational components -particularly in the public sector. School achievement data provide a rich source of information with which to investigate the productivity of leaders. Semi-parametric estimates of principal value-added to student achievement reveal significant variation in principal quality that appears to be higher for high-poverty schools. However, an alternate estimation approach based on the association between principal turnover and year-to-year variation in school value-added to achievement suggests that the variance of principal fixed effects appears to overstate the actual variation in principal productivity. Patterns of teacher exits are consistent with the belief that managerial decisions about the quality of teachers provide a primary channel for principals to raise school quality. Finally, the pattern of principal transitions reveals little systematic evidence of higher transition rates for more effective principals, particularly in high poverty schools.
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I. Introduction
Leadership quality is often cited as key to organizational success across such diverse places as boardrooms, sports arenas, national legislatures, and schools. Yet it is often quite difficult to distinguish cause and effect, as those anointed as great leaders may simply have been in the right place at the right time. The standard analytical approach to investigating the importance of leaders, developed in the analysis of private firms, has concentrated on the outcomes -typically revenues or profits -associated with the top managers who have varying backgrounds or experiences. But such an outcome approach requires an empirical model that effectively measures relevant characteristics of leaders or components of leadership and that isolates the contribution of leadership from a variety of other, perhaps correlated, factors driving outcomes.
Analysis of the impact of CEOs on corporate results has a lengthy history, where a variety of methods have been used to infer impacts from the pattern of market returns to a company * . In an important recent paper, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) provide an innovative new approach. Using semi-parametric approaches with panel data to identify the effects of CEOs and top managers, they find that variation in the effectiveness of leaders explains a significant portion of the variance in profits and other outcomes. By simultaneously estimating both firm and manager fixed effects, the authors control for time invariant differences among firms that could contaminate estimates of the variance in manager effectiveness. † A second strand of literature important for our analysis, recognizing that CEOs are far removed from much of the actual management activity, has focused on management practices at the plant level in firms. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) and related articles have documented the importance of differences in business and management practices across firms and countries using survey data to explain productivity differences. Their survey focuses on activities of plant managers in the manufacturing sector and attempts to describe key elements of management (such as the monitoring of employees or providing good hiring incentives). They find these surveyed attributes to be correlated not only with firm performance but also with aggregate productivity at the national level. It is at the same time not so much a direct study of the role and importance of managers as it is an investigation of management practices.
In this paper we combine elements of both strands of work in an investigation of variation in the quality of management in education. We begin with a semi-parametric analysis of the variance in principal effectiveness that extends Bertrand and Schoar (2003) in order to account for additional variation not caused by the leader. ‡ Following estimation of the variation in principal value added, we investigate one widely-discussed mechanism through which principals affect achievement: the management of teacher † However, changes over time in a variety of unobserved factors could inflate the estimated variance of manager behavior or productivity, even if the sample is limited to managers who work in at least two firms. Given the endogenous matching of firms and managers, there is a strong possibility that common unobservables are present in the multiple jobs worked during the sample period. For example, managers who were profitable in their first positions may have more opportunities to gain employment at firms on the upswing in terms of profits due perhaps to a negative random shock in the prior period. Moreover, nonpersistent factors orthogonal to manager quality or behavior will inflate the variance of the estimated fixed effects even if they do not bias the results. These are issues we consider below. ‡ We do, however, consider the role of decision making about teachers in making for effective principals.
transitions. Importantly, because high teacher turnover can be associated with both improvement and decline in the quality of instruction, the level of turnover per se provides little information on the wisdom of principal personnel decisions. Therefore we focus on the relationship between the quality of teachers who transition out of a school and the quality of principals.
Throughout the entire analysis, we are particularly interested in the assignment of principals to schools serving disadvantaged students. It is frequently asserted that high poverty schools are hurt by being unable to attract and retain good principals -with the commensurate impact on the ability to hire and retain good teachers. From case studies and anecdotal accounts, the importance of principals seems most apparent when considering schools serving disadvantaged populations. The demands of schools with poor-performing students including their more difficult working conditions and added difficulty attracting and retaining teachers may inflate the importance of having an effective leader as compared to the situation in a higher achieving school. §
The final component of the empirical analysis considers dynamics of the principal labor market. Do the best principals tend to move away from difficult to manage schools? Since the pay and careers in public service are insulated from performance in ways different from private sectors, it is not possible simply to track the pay of principals.
Instead, we turn to a direct investigation of the quality of movers and stayers within schools, particularly those serving disadvantaged populations.
II. The productivity of school leaders § Hanushek and Rivkin (2007) .
A dynamic and skilled school leader is frequently described as the key element of a high-quality school, and stories of the inspirational and effective principal are plentiful and oft-repeated. ** The leadership and decision-making provided by a school principal is proximate and tied directly to outcomes in her school, unlike that of a school superintendent of a large district who operates more like a CEO in terms of providing broad policy guidance. But there is no clarity from past work about what attributes might lead to a principal's success.
In contrast to the traditional revenue and return focus of CEO and management studies, our study changes the performance measurement to student achievement. Edmonds (1979) , Purkey and Smith (1983) , or the case studies in Carter (2000) . † † One place where management has previously been considered in public employment is in welfare offices, but much of this has concentrated on the narrower question of how managers react to different incentives; see, for example, Courty and Marschke (2004) and Heinrich and Marschke (2010) .
In broad terms, we take a generally agnostic view of the attributes of principals that are important and use school administrative data to concentrate on the more basic question of how important is variation in principal quality. The administrative data provide a particularly rich source of information for the investigation of leadership effects, because they enable the direct estimation of productivity on the basis of contributions to student achievement.
Most prior analysis of principal effectiveness has been qualitative, though a small number of papers examine the determinants of principal effectiveness and any links with the labor market. Brewer (1993) and Eberts and Stone (1988) find that specific principal characteristics are related to high school student achievement, though the limited set of covariates may fail to account for important factors that could introduce bias. Loeb, Kalogrides, and Béteille (forthcoming) look at how a school's value-added is related to the movement of teachers and suggest that this relationship is likely to reflect a principal's influence.
Finally, Cullen and Mazzeo (2008) investigate the link between principal salary growth and employment transitions on the one hand and principal effectiveness as measured by state accountability rating, achievement, and productivity on the other. They find a positive relationship between salary and both accountability rating and student achievement. Nonetheless, the inclusion of a limited set of student, school, and district controls leaves open the possibility that neither accountability rating nor student achievement provide a meaningful measure of principal effectiveness because of the contributions of unobserved student, family, peer and school factors.
Our central objective is to gain a better understanding of the overall impact and importance of principals, a fundamental issue for education policy. We do this in two different ways. First, following the general approach of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) we estimate models that include both principal and school fixed effects and generate estimates of the variance in principal effectiveness using the estimated principal fixed effects. Second, following the general approach used by Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) to estimate the variance in teacher quality, we generate estimates of the variance in principal effectiveness from the relationship between year-to-year variation in school achievement and principal transitions. This second approach accounts for some of the year-to-year fluctuations in achievement not caused by principals that inflate variance estimates based on principal fixed effects. Nonetheless, even the second approach may be vulnerable to biases introduced by unobserved factors. Therefore we take a number of steps to mitigate bias and examine the robustness of the results in both estimation frameworks.
III. The Texas Database
The administrative data used in this project were constructed as part of the UTD 
IV. Principal transitions
Instability of leadership is often cited as a detriment to school improvement. To understand typical patterns of principal movements, we begin by describing the distribution of principals by job tenure and the pattern of transitions with specific attention to differences by school poverty share and mathematics achievement. This focus reflects ongoing concerns about principal turnover in high poverty and low performing schools along with parallel evidence documenting the greater difficulty experienced by such schools in attracting and retaining teachers. *** Moreover, because our main estimates of principal effectiveness build on principal transitions, the description also presents information on the job changes used to generate those estimates.
Schools with a high proportion low income students (those eligible for a subsidized lunch) are more likely to have first year principals and less likely to have principals who have been at the school at least six years than those with a less disadvantaged population (Table 1) . † † † Nonetheless, the division of schools by initial achievement produces much larger differences. The proportion of principals in their initial year with a school is roughly 40 percent higher in schools with the lowest average § § Note that the achievement tests in Texas were changed in 2002, thus making comparison of results over time difficult. *** Teachers been shown to have preferences for the poverty, race, and achievement composition of students along with geographic locations; see Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) , Boyd et al. (2005) , Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner (2007) . † † † Nationally in 2009, principal departures from a school are virtually identical for schools that did and did not participate in the free or reduced-price lunch program (Battle (2010) ). Gates et al. (2006) find similar higher mobility in disadvantaged schools in North Carolina. As noted earlier the administrative data we use combine years as a principal with years spent in other roles including teaching. Therefore there is no information on tenure as a principal beyond the years observed in the sample.
initial achievement than those with the highest average initial achievement; the proportion of principals that have been at their current school at least six years is roughly 50 percent higher in the highest achievement schools. Differences are also far smaller when ordered by the black or Hispanic enrollment share (not shown). Perhaps more surprising, between 1 in 5 and 1 in 6 principals annually exit the Texas public schools, and the probability of exit does not vary much by tenure. § § § The probability of changing schools and remaining a principal rises from 5.9 percent following the first year at a school to 8.3 percent following the third through fifth years prior to falling back to 5.7 percent for those with tenures of at least six years. By comparison, the probability of transitioning to a non-principal role at a campus declines from 4.5 percent to 2.8 percent as tenure increases from one to at least six years. For those with at least two years of tenure approximately 2 percent make a transition to work as district administrators.
V. Fixed Effects Estimates of the Variation in Principal Effectiveness
The fundamental identification challenge is the separation of the contribution of principals from other factors that drive student achievement. In this section we describe the value-added model used to estimate principal fixed effects and the results of that estimation. Estimates are produced for a series of specifications and samples in order to ‡ ‡ ‡ See Battle (2010) . § § § Note that limiting the sample to principals with no more than 25 years of experience in order to lessen the contribution of retirements has little impact on these patterns.
examine the sensitivity of the variance estimates to potential confounding factors including test measurement error.
A. Empirical model
Our basic value-added model relates achievement (A) for student i in school s with principal p in year y to prior achievement, observed student characteristics (X), time varying school and peer characteristics (C), a vector of school fixed effects (γ) and a vector of principal-by-school fixed effects (θ). **** Adding a random error (ε), the empirical model is:
( 1) In the empirical model the vector X includes a full set of race and ethnicity indicators and indicators for subsidized lunch eligibility, special education participation, female and English as a second language indicators. It also includes the school structure to eliminate any special aspects of the grade pattern of achievement: a switch to the earliest grade offered in a different school (including structural transitions from elementary to middle school) and a switch to other than the earliest grade offered in a new school. The vector C of time-varying aggregate influences includes average demographic characteristics for students in school s in year y including proportion low income, proportion classified as special needs, proportion that are recent immigrants and proportion female. All **** While the general concept has been used in education for over three decades (see Hanushek (1979) ), the recent addition of extensive administrative data bases has led to expansion of both the empirical analysis (Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) ) and the understanding of fundamental underlying estimation and interpretation issues (Meghir and Rivkin (2011) ).
regressions also include a full set of year-by-grade indicators to account for test and other statewide policy changes. † † † †
B. Variance estimates based on three year spells
The impact of a principal on school quality likely increases with tenure given the persistence of personnel and other decisions, and comparisons among principals should account for differences in length of service at a school. Importantly, the impact may become more positive or more negative over time, so simple linear or polynomial controls for tenure are not appropriate. On the one hand, over time a principal would be expected to learn about school operations, the effectiveness of various teachers, and other school specific factors, and such learning would presumably improve job performance.
On the other hand, however, principal personnel decisions alter the stock of teachers and the school environment, and the impact of a principal increases over time as a principal accounts for more and more of the hiring and retention of the existing stock of teachers.
One approach to producing less ambiguous comparisons is to restrict the sample to the first three years of tenure at a school and to principals that complete three year spells (similar to an approach of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) ). The analysis of the sample of the first three years of a principal's tenure in a school begins with estimates from the basic value added model. Going down the rows reveals monotonic relationships between the poverty rate and the † † † † For the actual estimation, the data are aggregated prior to running the regressions to the campus-bygrade-by-year level to reduce the computational burden. All tables report absolute values of t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by campus. estimated variance that increases with the poverty share. An examination of the achievement impacts at various quantiles of the principal quality distribution shows that the increase in dispersion as the poverty level rises is most pronounced at the lower end of the principal quality distribution: The difference between the top and bottom poverty rate quartiles equals -0.20 standard deviations at the 10 th percentile, -0.17 standard deviations at the 25 th percentile but only 0.07 standard deviations at the 90 th percentile.
Thus the greater variance in principal effectiveness that accompanies increased poverty appears to come mostly from the much lower value-added in the lower tail of the distribution. Note, however, that this semi-parametric approach to estimating effectiveness cannot distinguish between the following two explanations for this pattern:
1) high poverty schools draw a disproportionate share of the least effective principals;
and 2) the adverse effect of low-productivity principals is larger in the most disadvantaged schools.
C. Test Measurement Issues
Test measurement issues potentially compromise the interpretation of the estimates.Not only can test measurement error and school differences in the skill distribution of students -the two major issues to be discussed below -contaminate the variance estimates but these effects may differ systematically by poverty level.
Existing research on teacher quality confirms the special measurement issues arising in the study of achievement test results. The substantial variation in both enrollment and student demographic characteristics among schools imply that the structure of tests and errors in test measurement potentially complicate the measurement of principal quality. ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ First, as Kane and Staiger (2002) (2) where is the estimated fixed effect for principal p, is the average fixed effect for principals, and V p is the estimated variance of that estimate, and A is the estimated variance of the principal-by-spell fixed effect distribution. Essentially, the shrinkage estimator pulls estimates toward the grand mean; the larger the fixed effect error variance for a principal spell, the more the adjusted fixed effect is shrunk toward the grand mean.
Second, the construction of the test may affect the translation of principal quality into measured student achievement when differences in the achievement distribution exist across schools. For example, in schools where many students score near the top of the test at the beginning of the school year such that test ceiling effects become binding, principal quality might have very little effect on standardized test scores even if the principal is having substantial impact on the overall level of intellectual engagement and quality of instruction in the school. This is particularly relevant for the TAAS scores that ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ Test measurement errors include both issues of reliability and of validity. Reliability encompasses whether a test will consistently yield the same score for a given domain, while validity focuses on how well the test assesses the intended material.
we rely upon for our analysis, because the test is focused on lower level skills and high achieving students could do very well on this test even without attending school.
Consequently our test score based estimates of principal quality may produce a more compressed distribution for groups of schools with larger shares of initially high achieving students. Because we are particularly interested in the possibility that principals may have larger effects in schools serving predominantly disadvantaged students who tend to have lower initial scores, producing valid comparisons across schools grouped by poverty rate requires that this concern be addressed.
We investigate the sensitivity of the estimates to student composition using two alternative methods. The simplest incorporates a more flexible specification of prior achievement in order to capture differences in expected test score growth by initial score.
Preliminary results (not reported) showed that polynomial terms for initial achievement had little effect on the estimates of principal effectiveness. However, the inclusion of quadratic or cubic terms may not fully address the problem given the skewness of the test score distribution.
Our preferred method is to weight observations in all schools and years with fixed weights in order to produce estimates of principal quality not influenced by differences in the test score distribution among schools. In particular, most schools have a mixture of students performing at different achievement levels, and it is the varying proportions that signify "advantaged" or "disadvantaged" in an achievement sense. Equation (3) shows the calculation used to produce weighted school-by-grade-by-year mean test score:
Where F i is the fixed weight share for test decile i, share sgyi is the actual share of students in school s in grade g in year y in decile i, N is enrollment, A is test score, and c indexes child. For this, we normalize scores on schools serving poverty students. The weights come from the distribution of 3 rd grade mathematics achievement scores in 1994 for students in the top quartile of schools in terms of proportion of students eligible for a subsidized lunch. F 1 is the share in the bottom test score decile, F 2 in the second decile, and on up to F 10 in the top decile. The scores of students at the low end of the distribution receive disproportionate weight in schools with small shares of such students relative to the weighting sample of higher poverty schools, while the scores of such students receive less than proportional weight in schools with a high concentration of initially low achieving students. Table 4 presents three sets of estimates for all schools combined that address these two measurement issues separately and then together. The top panel reproduces estimates from Table 3 , the second panel contains information based on the estimates summarized in Table 3 but shrunk to the grand mean on the basis of the standard errors; the third panel reports the variance and quantiles for estimates of principal fixed effects based on value added estimates of reweighted data that eliminate differences in the distribution of initial achievement among principals; finally, the bottom panel reports results based on reweighted data that have been shrunk to remove the effects of test error.
Note that separates estimates by poverty quartile (not reported) produce very similar patterns.
The similarity between the results in the top two panels shows that shrinkage has virtually no effect on the estimated distribution of principal quality. Unlike estimates of teacher value added that often rely on fewer than 50 observations for many teachers, estimated value added for principals of even quite small schools typically come from at least several hundred test scores. Consequently the variance of the error is likely to be quite small, and it is not surprising that shrinkage has little effect on the results.
In contrast, there are marked differences among schools in the initial achievement distribution, and this raises the possibility that the greater concentration of test scores at the lower end of the achievement distribution causes the larger variance in principal quality observed for high poverty schools. Re-weighting the scores such that the estimates for all principals are based on the same underlying distribution among student test score deciles lessens this concern. However, it does potentially increase the error variance by placing greater weight on smaller cells, and this may have a particularly large effect in very high and very low poverty schools Consistent with the notion that re-weighting increases the error variance, the use of the shrinkage estimator has a much larger effect on the re-weighted data. Nonetheless, after shrinking the variance estimates of the reweighted data (bottom panel) remain larger than those generated from the unweighted data (second panel), suggesting that test limitations may introduce downward bias into estimates of principal effects on learning.
Yet because of the possibility that reweighting could exacerbate unobserved influences for students in small cells, we use unweighted data in the remainder of the analysis in order to avoid overstating the variation in principal effectiveness.
D. School Fixed Effect Estimates
The prior estimates show substantial variation in principal value-added, but questions remain as to whether unobserved factors confound these estimates. If some salient differences among schools (that are not under the control of the principal) are not accounted for, estimates of combine true principal effects with unobserved differences in other school or student factors. To understand the potential for such bias, we include school fixed in the specifications. This eliminates the influence of time-invariant school differences at the cost of restricting principal comparisons to others who lead the same school. But, as a result, the estimated variance of the school fixed effect estimates of principal quality omits all between school variation in principal effectiveness, potentially underestimating variations in principal quality.
This addition, while resolving one set of estimation problems, introduces another.
One approach we used previously to producing less ambiguous comparisons was to restrict the sample to the first three years of tenure at a school and to principals that complete three year spells. Importantly, this restriction is not feasible in school fixed effects models that identify principal effectiveness on the basis of within school achievement differences, because the numbers of schools with two principals observed in their first three (or even two) years is quite small. Therefore in the fixed effects models we consider the full sample and do not control for years at the school, although we do examine the effects of introducing controls for the first year of a spell. Table 5 reports variance estimates from models with and without school fixed effects, because of the differences in sample composition. The Column 1 estimates show that estimates are somewhat larger in the full sample than in the sample restricted to the first three years at a school, perhaps not surprising given the wider range of experience in the sample. Regardless, Column 2 shows that the inclusion of the school fixed effects substantially reduces the variation in estimated principal quality. In both the separate poverty categories and for the sample taken as a whole, the inclusion of school fixed effects reduces the estimated variance of principal quality by more than 75 percent and the 75-25 and 90-10 differentials by more than 50 percent. Although some of this reduction likely reflects the elimination of influences from confounding factors, some of it likely reflects the elimination of real between-school variation in principal effectiveness.
VI. Principal Turnover-Based Estimates
Although unobserved factors that are orthogonal to principal quality do not bias estimates of principal effectiveness, they do amplify estimates of the variance in principal quality. If these factors vary over time within schools the inclusion of school fixed effects will not address the problem. To assess the importance of such factors, we turn to an entirely different approach to the estimation of the variance in principal effectiveness.
Building on Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) , we use principal turnover to identify the variance in principal quality.
Consider the divergence in achievement gain in successive years y and y' with a framework similar to equation (1) 
Taking the difference between years y and y' in average gains in achievement eliminates all fixed school effects, leaving only year-to-year differences in principal quality, other school influences and other unobserved time-varying factors as determinants of the difference in achievement gain.
Squaring this difference yields a natural characterization of the observed achievement differences between years as a series of terms that reflect the variances and covariances of the principal and school effects plus a catchall component e that includes all random error and cross product terms between principal and other year specific effects.
Taking the expectation of Equation 4 and assuming principals are drawn from common distributions over the restricted time period of the observations yields:
where ( ) is the variance of principal quality (other school influences) in school s and ( ) is the covariance in principal quality (other school influences) across cohorts.
Under the assumption that principal turnover is orthogonal to other changes that affect achievement gain, the within school variance in principal quality can be identified from a regression of the squared difference in cohort average gains on a dummy variable indicating that the two cohorts had different principals. Specifically, the parameter on the principal turnover dummy variable would equal two times the within school variance in principal quality.
Of course fluctuations in student characteristics and other school factors could directly increase the probability of principal turnover, and this would introduce doubts about the validity of the key estimation assumption. Therefore it is imperative to account directly for as many time varying student factors as possible. And although unobserved influences cannot be directly accounted for, the sensitivity of the estimate to the inclusion of significant time varying factors provides information on the likely existence and strength of unobserved factors that might confound the estimate. § § § §
The sensitivity of the turnover coefficient to the period over which we calculate the squared differences also provides information on the validity of the estimates. Given the likely increase over time in the impact of a new principal, we would expect smaller turnover coefficients for specifications using squared differences in gains for adjacent years straddling the transition than for specifications using squared differences for nonadjacent years with one year in-between (e.g. 1999 and 1997). The opposite finding of larger turnover coefficients for adjacent years would suggest the presence of additional turbulence around principal transitions and raise doubts about the validity of the estimates.
A related consideration concerns the increase in principal influence during the first two years at a school, a period in principal effects are likely to change substantially. § § § § Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) describe an informal approach to measuring the bias from unobserved factors on the basis of the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of observed characteristics.
In the turnover framework any such change would be incorporated into the counterfactual variance for non-transitions, since the year-to-year differences within a principal spell contribute only to the construction of the non-turnover variance regardless of whether there are real changes in the impacts of a given principal. If ignored, such changes will tend to bias downward estimates of principal effects based on the turnover coefficient. Therefore we include a dummy variable indicating that a difference is calculated over the first two years of a spell. Table 6 reports the different estimates of the variation in principal effectiveness, depending on the comparison group and different controls for student demographics. The estimates consider both adjacent and non-adjacent year variances and the inclusion of first year principal effects. The different principal coefficient estimates are positive and highly significant in all specifications, consistent with the existence of significant variation in principal quality. Moreover, the larger variance estimates based on a sample of non-adjacent year comparisons as opposed to estimates based on adjacent years that straddle the transition provide further support for the finding of significant variation in principal effectiveness. For example, the estimate increases from 0.0049 in the adjacent year specification to 0.0058 in the non-adjacent year specification. As discussed above,
given the growth over time in the influence of new principals we would expect nonadjacent year comparisons to show larger differences.
Finally, the lack of sensitivity of the different principal coefficient to the exclusion of the highly significant set of demographic characteristics suggests that neither observed nor unobserved heterogeneity inflates the estimates of the variation in principal effectiveness. Comparisons of Columns 1 and 2 and Columns 4 and 5 show that the exclusion of these variables has virtually no effect on the magnitude of the different principal coefficient.
The estimated differences in principal effectiveness are quite large. One standard deviation difference in principal quality translates into an increase of 0.05 standard deviations in the growth of student performance. This is one-third to one-half the size of the estimated variation in teacher effectiveness (see Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) and Hanushek and Rivkin (2010)) -but it applies to entire schools as opposed to just a single classroom. Table 7 reports different principal coefficients for both the adjacent year and interrupted year specifications by poverty quartile. All coefficients are positive, though only those for the third poverty quartile reach significance at the five percent level.
Nonetheless, although much noisier, the pattern of estimates mirrors that observed in previous tables: the variance in principal quality increases monotonically with the poverty share.
Taking both approaches together, three main findings emerge from the analysis: 1) there is significant variation in principal effectiveness; 2) variation increases with the school poverty share; and 3) the magnitude of the estimates falls substantially following the inclusion of school fixed effects and again following the focus on the additional variance associated with a change in principal. Although the latter finding is not definitive evidence that unobserved school differences bias estimates of principal effectiveness, the pattern of estimates is certainly consistent with this belief. Moreover, the findings indicate that sampling error introduces upward bias into the variance estimates.
The magnitude of the estimated variance in principal quality derived from the preferred principal turnover specifications is roughly half as large as estimates of the variance in teacher quality derived from similar specifications (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005)). In comparing the magnitudes, however, it is crucial to recognize that principal actions affect an entire school as opposed to a single class. A persistent one standard deviation increase in principal quality could thus exert an educationally important effect on long-term student academic performance for a large number of children. Moreover, both the school fixed effect and turnover specifications focus only on quality variation within schools, and any variation between schools is ignored.
VII. Principal quality and teacher turnover
A primary channel through which principals can improve the quality of education is by raising the quality of teachers either through improved instruction by existing teachers or through teacher transitions that improve the caliber of teaching (see, for example, Loeb, Kalogrides, and Béteille (forthcoming)). Much policy discussion focuses simply on turnover reduction given the well-known difficulties experienced by new teachers. However, the benefits of reducing turnover clearly depend on the skills of the incumbent teachers, and it is the composition of transitioning and entering teachers rather than simply the transition rate that is a key determinant of the change in the quality of schooling.
Because it is difficult to separate improvement in the quality of instruction by current teachers from other changes that raise achievement, we focus on teacher turnover.
Specifically, we would expect highly rated principals to be more successful at retaining the more effective teachers and moving out the less effective teachers. In contrast, we would expect less highly rated principals to be less successful in raising the quality of the teaching stock, because of less skill in evaluating teacher quality, less emphasis on teacher effectiveness in personnel decisions, or less success at creating an environment that is attractive for better teachers. If this is the case, adverse selection of teachers asked not to return should tend to be stronger in schools with higher quality principals. Note that better principals may also attract and hire more effective teachers, though the absence of quality measures for new teachers and the fact that principals may have little control over new hires leads us to focus on turnover.
Unfortunately the data do not contain information on personnel decisions, and teachers rather than principals initiate the majority of transitions. In addition, the data do not match students and teachers, meaning that we must draw inferences about teacher quality from grade average information. Although this avoids problems introduced by non-random assignment to classrooms that potentially biases estimates of teacher value added (see Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2006) and Rothstein (2010) ), it prevents direct comparisons of the quality of stayers and leavers. Consequently, our description of the relationship between estimates of the quality of exiting teachers and their principals is indirect.
A. Empirical Model
Consider an elementary school with four teachers each in grades 4 and 5, some of whom exit the school at the conclusion of the year. With accurate measures of teacher effectiveness and information on dismissals, we could investigate whether better principals are more likely to dismiss the least effective teachers. In the absence of such information, however, we focus on the relationship within schools between the share of teachers that exit each grade and the grade average value-added. Specifically we investigate whether the relationship between the teacher exit rate in a grade and grade average value added is more negative in schools with higher quality principals. This is quite a crude test of whether principals are dismissing their least effective teachers, as small grade average differences in mean value-added provide imperfect information on the probability that there is a very low performing teacher in one grade as opposed to another. Thus there may be circumstances in which the lowest performer teaches in the grade with the higher average teacher quality, and our approach would provide a misleading measure of whether the principal is dismissing the least effective teacher in these cases. Nonetheless, very low performers are likely to be disproportionately found in grades with lower average achievement.
Equation ( ***** Both the residual grade average gain and principal quality estimates are shrunk toward the grand means of zero using Bayesian shrinkage estimation described above.
(8)
The interaction terms are the variables of interest, and we would expect to observe larger negative coefficients as principal quality rises. A negative coefficient indicates that the exit rate is higher on average from the grade with the lower residual gain, and an increase in the magnitude of the coefficient reflects a stronger relationship between the grade deviations in exit rate and residual gain.
The findings in the previous section suggest that our direct estimates of principal quality overstate the variance even when shrunk, and this raises concerns about both measurement error and bias. Potential bias from omitted variables is likely greater when using principal quality estimates based on the three year sample without school fixed effects, while the potential for attenuation bias resulting from random influences is likely greater when using estimates based on the entire sample with school fixed effects. In the case of both measures we believe that the school by year fixed effects and consequent focus on grade differences within school and year mitigate concerns about inaccuracies in the estimates of principal quality. However, attenuation bias on the interaction-term coefficients may well be present, particularly in specifications that use the principal quality estimates generated by school fixed effect regressions.
B. Teacher Turnover
Teacher turnover itself has been a significant concern, especially as it is linked to schools with concentrated disadvantaged populations (see Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) and Boyd et al. (2005) ). To understand the issues, we begin with a description of teacher transitions to other campuses within the same district, other districts and out of the Texas public schools. We divide transitions by principal quality and school poverty to provide a context with which to consider teacher transitions. Figure 1 (not included)
shows that the teacher transition rate is highest in schools with the least effective principals, regardless of the rate of school poverty, consistent with teachers' concerns about working conditions and the importance of leadership (see, for example, Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) , Hanushek and Rivkin (2007) ). However, in the remaining three categories there is little difference in overall turnover, with the exception of the highest poverty schools in which turnover in the 2 nd quartile of principal quality is closer to the bottom quartile than the others. In fact turnover in the top principal quality schools is uniformly higher than that in the next category.
In terms of teacher destination, it is the rate of departure to other districts that tends to be much higher in schools with the least effective principals and lower in schools with the most effective principals; in fact district switching decreases monotonically as principal quality rises in all four poverty categories. Hanushek et al. (2005) find that districts switchers tend on average to outperform teachers moving within the district and those exiting the public schools entirely, and differences in the rate of district switching is consistent with the notion that higher quality principals are losing a smaller share of more effective teachers. Table 8 reports estimates of our difference-in-differences model from specifications using two sets of principal quality estimates -those generated by the three year sample specifications without school fixed effects and those generated from the entire sample specifications with school fixed effects. The first two columns combine all poverty categories and the final two columns report results for the highest poverty category, the group of schools with the highest estimated variance in principal quality and highest rate of teacher turnover. Estimates for the remaining poverty categories (not reported) are quite imprecise.
C. Results
Regardless of whether the principal quality estimates come from specifications with school fixed effects, the results in Columns 1 and 2 reveal a negative relationship between teacher turnover and residual gain that is highest for the highest quality principal. The results present a strong pattern consistent with an active management of the teacher force by the best principals. Not surprisingly, the estimates become noisier in the specifications that use principal quality estimates from school fixed effect regressions.
In addition to the imprecision of the estimates of principal quality, the stochastic character if the grade average residual gain estimates raises the possibility of additional attenuation bias. We therefore consider the "reverse regression" in which school-gradeyear average achievement is regressed on lagged achievement, student characteristics, the teacher exit rate, and interactions between the teacher exit rate and indicators for the 2 nd , 3 rd , and top quartiles of principal quality. Again we would expect to observe negative coefficients that increase in magnitude with principal quality.
The structure of Table 9 is identical to that of Table 8 as is the pattern of results.
Here the monotonic ordering in terms of principal quality holds for both measures of principal quality, though again the coefficients from specifications using school fixed effect principal quality estimates are smaller and less precise. In the case of the high poverty schools, the coefficients also increase monotonically in magnitude with principal quality, and the interaction term coefficient for the highest quality principal is significant even in the specification that uses the school fixed effect principal quality estimates.
Taken as a whole, these results support the belief that managing teacher turnover is a channel through which principals influence the quality of education. Not only does the negative selection of exiting teachers become stronger as principal quality rises, but
the strongest relationship appears in the high poverty schools, precisely the schools with the largest variance in estimated principal quality and highest rate of teacher turnover.
VIII. The Quality Dimension of Principal Transitions
Differences in the distribution of principal effectiveness by school demographic composition receive considerable policy attention. Many bemoan high rates of teacher and administrator turnover in high poverty schools. Because high poverty, high student turnover schools may confront more difficulties in attracting and retaining teachers and in maintaining discipline, it would not be surprising if principal quality were to have a larger effect in on outcomes in such schools. In addition, underlying differences in the distribution of principal quality may also contribute to any observed variation in principal added.
But no prior analysis has been able to describe systematically any differences that might exist in the mobility patterns of high and low quality principals. We can now return to the topic of principal mobility with a new perspective. The magnitude of the turnover problem depends in large part on whether high or low quality principals are leaving. In order to gain a better understanding of this issue, we describe principal transitions following their third year in a school by principal quality and the share of students eligible for a subsidized lunch. Principals may remain in the same school as principal, remain in the same school in another capacity, take a principal position in another school, take a different position in another school, move to a central administrative position, or exit the public schools entirely. Because of the very small shares of principals that transition to other positions, Table 10 focuses on principal transitions to other schools and out of the public schools entirely; Appendix Table a1 reports shares for these other transitions. Note that the principal quality measures are based on unweighted data for principals with fewer than 25 years of total experience in order to minimize complications introduced by the retirement decision. † † † † † Table 10 shows that, with the exception of the lowest poverty schools, there is not a monotonically increasing relationship between the probability of remaining in the same position and principal quality. Rather principals in the 2 nd quartile are substantially more likely to remain than those in the bottom quartile, the differential between those in the 2 nd and 3 rd quartiles tends to be somewhat smaller (or almost zero for those in the highest poverty schools), and the most effective principals are actually less likely to remain in the same position than those in the 3 rd quality quartile. In general, the probability of exiting the public schools entirely moves as the mirror image of the probability of remaining in the same position.
A troubling aspect of Table 10 is the substantial share of low performing principals who transition to principal positions at other schools. This is particularly striking in the two highest poverty categories where over 12% of poor performers make † † † † † Note, however, that the experience restriction has virtually no effect on the observed transition patterns. Retirement is based on the sum of teacher and principal experience so that the inability to distinguish types of prior experience does not enter into these calculations.
such a move. In contrast, less than 7% of the poorest performers in the two lower poverty categories become principals at other schools.
The simple conclusion is that the operation of the principal labor marketconstrained in a variety of ways by inertia in salaries, historical absence of good performance measures, and other restrictions in public sector operations -does not appear to screen out the least effective principals. Instead they frequently just move to different schools. Whether this reflects the bargain necessary to move out an ineffective leader in a public sector organization merits additional study.
IX. Conclusion
We have emphasized the importance of variations in principal quality. But, before going into those, it is also worthwhile putting this analysis into the context of understanding the importance of managers. For profit making firms, several different approaches have recently been introduced. One considers how important CEOs might be to differences in firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar (2003) ). The other goes into more depth about the specific managerial processes that promote higher performance (Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) ). Borrowing from both perspectives and moving into the public sector, we focus on plant-level (school) management, but try to address the larger question of just how big is the variation of managers.
The specific application to schools is particularly relevant to current policy
debates. An important facet of many school policy discussions is the role of strong leadership, particularly of principals. Leadership is viewed as especially important in revitalizing failing schools. This discussion is, however, largely uninformed by systematic analysis of principals and their impact on student outcomes. More generally assertions about the importance of leaders in many occupations and circumstances lack empirical backing.
Understanding the impact of principals on learning is a particularly difficult analytical problem. The non-random sorting of principals and students among schools, persistence in principal effects, and other changes over time complicate efforts to identify principal effectiveness. The fact that the magnitude of the estimated variance declines substantially following the inclusion of school fixed effects and again following the focus on the additional variance associated with a change in principal suggests that direct estimates of principal (or CEO) fixed effects combine real value added with sampling error and other influences.
Nonetheless, the results based on principal turnover suggest the existence of substantial variation in principal effectiveness, particularly in higher poverty schools. The pattern of results is consistent with both the hypothesis that principal skill is more important in the most challenging schools and the hypothesis of larger variation in underlying skills in high poverty schools -explanations that need not be mutually exclusive.
There are many channels through which principals influence school quality, though the precise mechanisms differ based on regulatory and institutional structures that define principal authority. Because all principals participate in personnel decisions, we focus on the composition of teacher turnover. The finding that the negative selection of exiting teachers is stronger in schools with higher value added principals supports the belief that the improvement in the stock of teacher quality provides an important channel through which principals can raise the quality of education. Moreover, the fact that the relationship appears to be strongest in high poverty schools is consistent with the finding of larger variation in principal quality in these schools.
Finally, patterns of principal transitions suggest that it is the least and most effective that tend to leave schools, suggesting some combination of push and pull factors; this pattern is particularly pronounced in higher poverty schools. A troubling finding on transitions shows that a substantial share of ineffective principals in high poverty schools take principal positions in other schools and districts. Much more needs to be learned about the dynamics of the principal labor market, just as much more needs to be learned about the underlying factors that contribute to teacher transitions. Observations are weighted by the number of students in the school--grade--year cell. 
